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Abstract: 
 
The paper defines economic security as a country’s ability to re distribute incomes through a 
strong governance structure by practicing rule of law, eliminating corruption and a government that 
acts as a facilitator by formulating effective fiscal and monetary policy and regulation. The results 
suggest that courts that implement national laws effectively and punish corruption and a government 
that has balance budgets and investment friendly monetary policy ensures economic security by 
means of welfare friendly outcomes that favor the incomes of the poor and middle class. There is 
also evidence that redistribution takes place from rich to the poor. As a result income and wage 
inequalities fall down. 
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1. Introduction:  
 
In most of the last 20 years, the criterion of good economic policy and the barometer of 
good governance focused itself on their effects on per capita income growth in developing 
countries. Economic efficiency models were transferred to many developing countries who had 
become adherents to the Washington consensus. Structural Adjustment Plan (SAP) is the most 
well known one of the recommended programs of economic development, which has been 
implemented in many developing countries with the help of Bretton Woods’s institutions like 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  
 
As per the advice of Bretton Woods’s institutions and in an effort to achieve economic 
efficiency, most developing countries dismantled their barriers to international trade in goods 
and services during the last 20 years. As a result, the size of world trade in goods and services 
dramatically increased. Success stories also emerged as an outcome of contemporary 
globalisation. China and India, witnessed unprecedented rise in their growth rates as well as 
significant poverty alleviation. However, for most countries, globalisation came with mixed 
experiences. Despite integration to the world economy, most countries of Latin America, Africa 
(sub-Saharan) and some in Asia failed to accomplish decent growth rates. In many countries in 
the South, poverty increased. Even if some grew at a decent rate, they failed to put a 
downward pressure on the increasing trends in poverty levels. For example, Pakistan, which 
recently witnessed a growth rate of eight per cent, has also witnessed increase in poverty levels 
from 30 per cent to 35 per cent as of 2005. Even in China and India, the falling poverty trends 
are not sustainable, as there is evidence of rapidly rising inequalities.  
 
Irrespective of rising trends of poverty in some developing countries and rising within 
country inequalities in some, a more important fact is that many developing countries 
encountered conditions of severe economic collapse amid Structural Adjustment Plans. These 
include mostly the countries in Latin America like Argentina who embraced free market 
ideology far more intensively than any other country in the developing world. Surprisingly, 
Argentina had historically been far more developed per capita wise than countries like India, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, or regions like Sub Saharan Africa or Mena countries, but 
instead of converging to the developed country incomes their path to development has 
seriously been hampered by significant economic collapse post 1980s economic reforms and 
they are stagnating ever since, still struggling with one macro-economic crises after another. 
 
Where did they go wrong may tell a whole lot about where do most developing countries 
have gone wrong? It is a story of good policies but bad timing. The policies fail because larger 
determinants of development are not taken into account. A focus on income generation 
without looking at prevalent institutions may lead to economic disaster. In developing 
countries, other than being poor of the poorest, many are relatively poorer than the others 
because they are economically and socially excluded because of their ethnic origin, religion or 
geographical region. It is observed that when these developing countries generate more 
incomes through policies like integration, the incomes are further distributed un-equally.  
 
This is the same phenomenon as global inequality; where some countries (regions) of the 
world have gained less than the other countries because of their geographical location, 
underdeveloped institutions or mere lack of economic capability (because of the presence of 
deep rooted informal markets). As mentioned above, with the exception of China and India, 
more developing countries have failed to alleviate poverty even though they have witnessed 
some short to medium term spurts in per capita income growth rates. The poor remained poor 
but rich got richer. Has income inequality prevented growth to trickle down to the poor? 
 
In this retrospect, the problem of poverty cannot be separated from the way in which 
growth is achieved. Other than economic growth, what is the point of reference to economic 
development, especially when it is about ensuring equity?  
 
Under global processes of production, where trading societies learn and coordinate among 
each other to find common ground for carrying out contemporary social norms that fit 
international standards and where business protects labor rights, promotes gender sensitivity, 
brings efficient social welfare systems while following best commerce practices, there are not 
one but a myriad combination of common institutions, which simultaneously play a role in 
facilitating each country’s smooth exposure to global markets and international competition. 
Thus, it is important to look at the different institutional structures countries may have while 
working along with the surge of globalisation. 
 
Thus market-friendly policies may not work in the absence of good institutions. In Russia, the 
lack of a supportive legal, regulatory and political apparatus has been responsible for the failure 
of the economy and its reform process. In Latin America, little attention paid to the 
mechanisms of social insurance and to the safety nets has resulted in dissatisfaction with 
market-oriented reforms. India, in comparison to the countries mentioned above, is not only 
the largest democracy in the world in terms of population, but the country is also one of the 
fastest growing economies in the world with a precedence of sound legal institutions. Due to 
robust legal institutions, the country is politically less volatile when compared to its neighbor 
Pakistan, even though both countries have seen an emergence of multiparty governance 
setups. However, because they are developing countries, much like those in Latin America, 
social institutions are underdeveloped, which means that a well-meaning democracy may not 
exist in India until economic progress reaches out to the masses and benefits the impoverished 
peripheries.  
 
Why market friendly policies may fail to work in developing countries? To achieve higher 
growth rates, economic freedom is a pre-requisite condition. Usually, economic freedom is 
determined by good economic policies, which as discussed above can be very well a prerogative 
of good leadership rather than good institutions, especially in case of developing countries. The 
fundamentals of good economic policies lie in promotion of private sector by implementing 
rules like private property rights and decreasing the burden of public exchequer.  
 
 Reliance of economic growth by giving more weight to short term growth strategies is to 
promote a half baked development recipe which is bound to fail. Most governments have 
focused on macro-economic gains. That is why policy advice post Washington Consensus on 
structural adjustment had a blind following by most developing countries, without asking 
whether good macro-economics is a sufficient condition for good development. Globalization is 
accused of increasing poverty as well as inequality in many countries, due to numerous cases of 
growth collapse. While at the same time, many suggest that the developing countries have not 
done enough to avoid disaster. Under the dynamic Hecksher-Ohlin model it may be that 
developing countries can not do enough under the biased competition environment prevailing 
in international markets due to certain protectionary policies of developed nations which is 
much evident by the political economy of the WTO (World Trade Organization. (Stiglitz, 2006) 
Good economic policy advice has to accommodate indigenous limitation of each country. 
Currently international initiatives like WTO are becoming a symbol of protection than promoter 
of equal competition opportunities and the bias is seen in favor of the developed countries 
partly because the negative fall out of globalization has been felt even in developed countries 
as most rich and middle-income countries are experiencing rising economic inequality 
generated by skill-biased technological change, international trade and other factors related to 
globalization. (Smeeding 2002) 
 
For India and China, it is equal distribution of economic gains which has become more 
relevant in recent times, while in Latin American countries like Argentina and Brazil, growth and 
distribution go hand in hand. So what are the key characteristics which matter equally good to 
income generation and re-distribution of income?  
 
In developing countries, income inequalities can be affected in two ways. (1) Adopt policies 
which have a redistributive outcome by shifting gains from rich to the poor. (2) Or raise the 
share of income in sectors which mostly employ the poorer segments of the society. In this 
context, both institutions and trade may have a strong redistributive power.  
 
The countries with poor institutions are likely to have high inequality. For example in Russia 
in the 1990s, a small group of entrepreneurs were successful in exploiting their political clout to 
promote their own interests, subverting the emergence of institutions committed to the 
protection of smaller shareholders and businesses. According to the Corruption Perceptions 
Index published by Transparency International, among the transition economies, Estonia is 28 
and Hungary 31; whereas Russia is 79 and Ukraine 83. In these transition economies, poor 
performance of public institutions, absence of effective implementation on property rights, and 
presence of business regulation which favor of influential parties, absence of trust in the courts 
to resolve business disputes, tax evasion and higher levels of rent seeking have strong 
correlation with high inequality in the society. (Hellman and Kaufman 2002) Similarly, in several 
Latin American countries, the ruling elites, the military and large businesses impeded smaller 
business interests. Chong and Gradstein (2004), show that when the political bias in favor of the 
rich is large, income inequality and poor institutional quality may reinforce each other, 
confirming endogeneity between the two. 
 
 
As mentioned, market outcomes (trade) and prevailing institutions are also correlated and 
endogenously determine income distribution. Trade opening in societies with weak institutions 
may lead to worse economic policies with rising inequalities unless and until poor institutions 
are controlled for by giving them ample time to develop. (Segura-Cayuela 2005) For example, 
the transition economies that implemented trade reforms slowly and where government 
institutions were able to perform well with time, smaller increases in inequality and smaller 
output decline occurred. However, the transition economies which opened up rather vigorously 
without considering prevalent corrupt government structures (and other underdeveloped 
institutions) performed poorly. In such countries poverty and inequality increased while high 
trade deficits had occurred after trade liberalization accounting for a capital flight. (Yudaeva 
2002) Rising inequalities as an outcome of bad policies (mismanagement or mistiming) may 
even lead to political upheavals against globalization and further integration.  
 
 
Here we are concerned with legal and economic institutions representing good functioning 
courts and a government. Legal institutions capture the transparency and fairness of the legal 
system, preservation of political rights of the citizens, state legitimacy, freedom of speech, 
independence of judiciary, enforceability of contracts, police effectiveness, access to 
independent and impartial courts, confidence in judicial system in insuring property rights, 
prevention of improper practices in public sphere, control of corruption and so on. Economic 
institutions comprise state effectiveness at collecting taxes or other forms of government 
revenue. As well as, the ability to create, deliver and maintain vital national infrastructure, the 
ability to respond effectively to domestic economic problems; independence of government 
economic policies from pressure of special interest groups, trade and foreign exchange; 
competition policy, privatization, banking reform and interest rate liberalization, securities and 
non-bank financial institutions. 
 
The legal and economic institutions are strong in developed countries while developing 
countries have mixed experiences. For example, the US and most advanced societies vigorously 
protect intellectual property rights, but this is not the case in many developing countries. 
(Rodrik 1999) Gupta et al. (1998) find that if government officials use their authority for private 
gain and indulge in corruption, it affects the effectiveness of social spending and the formation 
of human capital by perpetuating an unequal distribution of asset ownership and unequal 
access to education. Corruption also affects government effectiveness as it weakens tax 
administration and can lead to tax evasion and improper tax exemptions. Higher corruption is 
associated with increased inequalities in education, land distribution and health spending. 
Wealthy urban elites can lobby the government for biased social expenditure towards higher 
education and tertiary health, which tends to benefit high-income groups. (Ibid 1998) 
 
 
In this paper we look at the relationship of these institutions with income distribution and 
redistribution capturing economic security in a country while taking integration as a control 
group.  
 
Table 1:Summary Statistics 
Variables Code Source Obs Std . Dev 
Dependent     
GINI Coefficient in Percentage Points as calculated by WIDER, 
1995 
Gini UNU/WIDER World 
Income Inequality 
Database (WIID) 
http://www.wider.unu.edu
/wiid/wiid.htm 
117 (35.00) 
UTIP-UNIDO Wage Inequality THEIL Measure, 1999 Theil99 -  Same  - 155 (0.099) 
Lowest income decile, 1995 Low10 -  Same  - 117 (1.05) 
Fifth income percentile/ First income percentile , 1995 High20/ Low20 -  Same  - 117 (2.28) 
Third income percentile, 1995 Thrd20 -  Same  - 117 (2.22) 
Highest income decile, 1995 High10 -  Same  - 117 (7.50) 
Endogenous Independent     
Openness Variables     
(Exports +Imports)/GDP at current dollar prices, 1985 Lcopen World Development 
Indicators 
170 (0.589) 
Import Penetration: overall, 1985 Impnov85 Pritchett (1996) 96 (21.08) 
Import Penetration: overall, 1982 Impnov82 Pritchett (1996) 95 (23.85) 
TARS trade penetration,: overall, 1985 Tars85 Pritchett (1996) 96 (36.91) 
TARS trade penetration,: overall, 1982 Tars82 Pritchett (1996) 93 (83.10) 
     
Trade Policy Variables     
Import duties as % imports,1985 Tariffs World Development 
Indicators 
99 (8.903) 
Tariffs on international inputs and capital goods, 1985 Owti Sachs and Warner 
(1995) 
98 (0.165 
Trade taxes/ trade, 1982 Txtrdg Pritchett (1996) 54 (0.031) 
Weighted average of total import charges, 1985 Totimpov85 Pritchett (1996) 
(Available for developing 
countries only) 
76 (21.30) 
Non trade barriers frequency on intermediate inputs, 1985 Owqi Sachs and Warner 
(1995) 
96 (0.24) 
Non-tariff barriers Coverage: overall, 1987 Nontarr87 Pritchett (1996) 
(Available for developing 
countries only) 
76 (36.305) 
Sachs and Warner’s composite openness index, 1980 Open80s Edwards (1998) 61 (0.446) 
 
 
Institutions     
Courts     
Rule of Law, 1999 
Range: 2.5 to -2.5 
Rl Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi (2003) 
166 (0.937) 
Control for Corruption, 1999 
Range: 2.5 to -2.5 
Ctc Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi (2003) 
159 (0.910) 
 
Government 
    
Government effectiveness, 1999 
Range: 2.5 to -2.5 
Ge Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi (2003) 
157 (0.893) 
Regulatory quality, 1999 
Range: 2.5 to -2.5 
Rq Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi (2003) 
166 (0.892) 
 
Instruments 
    
Natural logarithm of predicted trade shares computed from a bilateral 
trade equation with ‘pure geography’ variables, 
Lfrkrom Frankel and Romer (1999) 163 (16.75) 
Fraction of the population speaking English Engfrac Hall and Jones (1999) 182 (0.236) 
Fraction of the population speaking one of the major languages of 
Western Europe: French, German, Portugese or Spanish 
Eurfrac Hall and Jones (1999) 185 (0.380) 
Distance from the equator of capital city measured as abs 
(Latitude)/90 
Disteq Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson (AJR) (2001) 
208 (16.65) 
     
 
 
 
 
 
2. Data and Methodology  
 
There are different measures of inequality which may determine within country inequality 
and they have been widely discussed in recent literature (see for example Wade, 2004; 
Milanovic, 2006). Most studies concentrate on the positive or negative effects of globalization 
or integration on income distribution while employing diverse proxies of income distribution. 
Not many studies concentrate on the effects of institutions on inequality. There is a need to 
simultaneously model the effects of institutions and integration on income distribution. 
 
As table 1 suggests we use Kaufman et al’s (2003) governance indicators. Rule of law (Rl) and 
Control for Corruption (Ctc) are categorized as legal institutions representing courts. 
Government effectiveness (Ge) and Regulatory quality (Rq) are economic institutions 
representing the government. As mentioned above, international trade is also a significant 
determinant of inequality. Thus international trade enters the regression model to enhance its 
explanatory power. This paper incorporates not one but eight various concepts of integration 
based on outcome as well as incidence based measures of trade barriers. The ratio of nominal 
imports plus exports to GDP (Lcopen) is the conventional openness indicator. Two other 
measures of openness are overall trade penetration (tarshov) derived from the World Bank’s 
TARS system and overall import penetration (Impnov) respectively. Import tariffs as percentage 
of imports (Tariffs), tariffs on intermediate inputs and capital goods (Owti), trade taxes as a 
ratio of overall trade (Txtrg) and total import charges (Totimpov) can all be considered as good 
proxies for trade restrictiveness and have also been employed in this study. Other measures 
that capture restrictions in overall trade are non-tariff barriers. Overall non-tariff coverage 
(Ntarfov) and non-tariff barriers on intermediate inputs and capital goods (Owqi) are used here 
as two proxies for non-tariff barriers. Sachs and Warner’s (1995) openness index (Open80) is 
utilised as a composite measure of trade policy. 
 
Now, we need to select inequality measures (related with incomes) or re-distribution (of 
income) to enter the left hand side of the empirical model. Our first concern is to know how 
income inequality is generally determined in empirical literature. It is a difficult question 
because comparable and consistent measures of income inequality, whether on a household 
level or per head basis are difficult, almost implausible and generally even if obtained fail to 
provide adequate or accurate longitudinal and cross-country coverage. For this, recent 
literature on income inequality prefers global income inequality indicator over country specific 
ones (see Milanovic, 2006). Nonetheless, cross country income inequality indices representing 
global inequality are also prone to controversies. For example, between-country world PPP 
income inequality using per capita GDPs, equal country weights (China=Uganda), through a GINI 
estimate has been found to have increased since 1980s. However between country world PPP 
income inequalities with countries weighted by population has been found to be constant or 
falling since around 1980s. (See Wade, 2004) 
 
As mentioned we are only interested in within country effects of inequality in order to partly 
differentiate between recent (post reform) evolution of within country inequality between 
developed and developing countries. Despite its apparent weaknesses, to capture within 
country income inequality, we have little choice but to employ controversial and much 
criticized upon within country GINI income inequality index (Gini) which is available from 
UNU/WIDER World Income Inequality Database (WIID). (Atkinnson and Brandolini: 2001) 
 
In addition to GINI we have employed other concepts of within country inequality. UTIP-
UNIDO Theil measure (Theil) calculated by the University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP) 
captures wage inequality between skilled and unskilled labor in manufacturing pay sector and 
available for both developed and developing countries. On the data methodological front 
manufacturing pay, based on UNIDO Industrial Statistics provides indicators of inequality that 
are more stable, more reliable and more comparable across countries because UNIDO 
measures are based on a two or three digit code of International Standard Industrial 
Classification (ISIC), a single systematic accounting framework. Furthermore, for nearly 40 years 
most countries around the world have measured manufacturing pay with reasonable accuracy 
as a matter of official routine. (Galbraith and Kum 2002) 
 
In order to add direct measures of redistribution into the empirical exercise, this chapter 
employs income deciles and percentiles derived from UNU/WIDER World Income Inequality 
Database (WIID). Institutions will be good for redistribution of resources if they are positively 
related with the incomes of the bottom 10 per cent (low10) and negatively related with the 
income of the top 10 per cent (high 10). Income groups are also divided into quintiles 
anticipating the effect of institutions to be negative for the ratio between the top 20 per cent 
and bottom 20 per cent (high20/low20) and positive for the middle-income groups (Middle20). 
Of special interest is how quality of institutions relates to the incomes of the middle-class or the 
ones living in the bottom income share. Each country observation for all inequality measures 
come from the last year for which data is available and in most cases represent inequality in the 
mid-1990s. Our basic inequality and income share equations would look like: 
Inequality or Income Share = f (Institutions, Integration, Geography) ..... (1) 
Corresponding to Eq. (1), the inequality model based on Theil index has 2 equations 
whereas each equation corresponds to a different institutional classification. The model 
specifications for Gini, High20/Low20, Middle20, Low10 and High10 contain the same 2 
equations each with the same variable specifications.  
iiii GeonIntegratioCourtsTheil 11111    (2) 
iiii GeonIntegratioGovernmentTheil 22222    (3) 
The variable iTheil  is Theil index in a country i, iCourts and iGovernment are respectively 
measures for legal and economic institutions, whereas inIntegratio measures general openness 
in the economy or trade policy and i  is the random error term. Equations based on Gini, 
High20/Low20, Middle20, Low20 and High10 have similar specifications. 
 
There are potential endogeneity problems between institutions and integration and 
between institutions and inequality itself. Therefore the institutional, trade policy and openness 
proxies presented here were first regressed on a set of instruments. Frankel and Romer (1999) 
(FR) makes up for the instrument for all the outcome and incidence measures of trade barriers 
utilized in this chapter. FR instrument uses trade/GDP shares constructed based on a gravity 
equation for bilateral trade flows. Following, Hall and Jones (1999), the extent to which the 
primary languages of Western Europe are the first languages are taken as instruments for Legal 
and Economic institutions. Hall and Jones argue that the instruments do not correlate with the 
error term. Though, it is good to briefly mention again that Acemolgu, Johnson and Robinson 
(2001) (AJR) identify the mortality of European settlers as a potential instrument. Using two ex 
post assessments of institutional quality—risk of expropriation by the government and 
constraints on the executive—as measures of institutions, they showed that settler mortality is 
a strong predictor of institutions.  
 
According to Glaeser et al. (2004), AJR instrument of settler mortality fails to be orthogonal 
to the error term. ‘Settler mortality is strongly correlated not just with ancient, but also with 
the modern, decease environment, suggesting that it might be the decease environment, 
rather than history, that matters for economic development. Secondly, settler mortality is 
strongly correlated with human capital accumulation, suggesting that it cannot be used as an 
instrument for institutions.’ (Glasear et al. 2004: 8)  
 
Following are the model specifications for first stage regressions based on IV:  
iiiii DisteqFREurEngCourts 111111    (4) 
iiiii DisteqFREurEngGovernment 222222    (5) 
iiiii DisteqFREurEngnIntegratio 333333    (6) 
Where iEng  and iEur  are the instruments for legal (LI) and economic (EI) referring to 
fractions of population speaking English and European languages respectively. iFR  is 
instrument for integration. iDisteq  is proxy for geography showing distance from the equator. 
At the second stage, the income share equations employ the predicted values of respective 
institutional, openness / trade policy variables.  
3. Results 
3.1. 1st Stage Results 
The first stage results are presented in table 2. All instruments seem to work quite well for the 
outcome based (openness) measures of trade barriers and high R-square and F-statistic show 
that instruments significantly explain the variation in trade shares. However for incidence based 
(trade policy) measures of trade barriers, F-statistics have declined and range between 7 and 5. 
For tariffs on international inputs and capital goods (Owti), weighted average for total import 
charges (Totimpov85), Non-tariff barrier coverage (Nontarr87) and Sachs and Warners 
composite openness index (Open80), the FR instrument is significant. FR trade shares are 
weekly related with import duties (Tariffs) and trade taxes (Txtrdg). For NTBs, instruments are 
insignificant in all cases, while F-statistics is mere 0.73. Here Low F-statistics for incidence based 
measures may indicate that instruments employed are weakly related with the regressors. 
Instruments work quite well for Legal and Economic institutions with F-statistic much higher 
than 10, and high R2, while all instruments are significantly related with all institutional 
regressors. Low F-statistics may not necessarily confers to weakness of instruments. Staiger and 
Stock (1997) rule of thumb of F-test to be equal to or greater than 10 for the good fit of 
instruments may only hold in case of one instrument and one regressor. When the number of 
instruments are moderate or large, higher order asymptotic tests, which are already proposed 
in chapter 2, needs to be carried out. Higher order asymptotic tests include (1) obtaining Craag 
and Donald (1993) critical values to reject 2SLS bias and (2) Anderson-Rubin test of joint 
significance of endogenous regressors for relevance of instruments; (3) Hansen or Sargan over 
identification test statistics for endogeneity; and (4) Baum, Schaffer and Stillman’s (2003) 
recommended test for heteroskedasticity robust 1st stage estimates for reducing omitted 
variable bias. To carry out all these tests, the author refers to IV stage analysis where these 
higher order asymptotic testing is done and made it available for many of the 2SLS 
specifications which are run under Eq. 2 and 3. In all these specification different definitions of 
inequality are utilized along with different specifications of Legal and Economic institutions and 
integration as regressors. 
 
Table. 2. First Stage Regression for Trade, Courts and Government 
First Stage Results: Openness and Trade Policy 
  
Nominal Trade 
share (lcopen) 
 
Import 
penetrations 
1985 
(Impnov85) 
 
Import 
penetrations 
1982 
(Impnov82) 
 
TARS trade 
penetration 
1985 
(Tarshov85) 
 
TARS trade 
penetration 
1982 
(Tarshov82 
 
Import duties 
as % Imports 
(Tariffs) 
 
Tariffs on 
international 
inputs and 
capital goods 
(Owti) 
 
Trade taxes 
(Txtrdg) 
         
Lfrkrom 0.533 11.616 19.811 29.88 46.47 -1.02 -0.078 0.0048 
 (11.5)*** (7.9)*** (7.2)*** (7.4)*** (4.0)*** (-0.8) (-3.4)*** (0.98) 
Engfrac 0.407 19.71 20.609 29.78 115.99 -1.49 -0.01 0.001 
 (2.1)** (2.4)*** (2.2)** (2.0)** (2.9)*** (-0.3) (-0.1) (0.08) 
Eurfrac -0.208 -6.656 -7.67 -5.23 -4.598 -3.56 -0.067 -0.016 
 (-1.9)* (-1.23) (-1.21) (-0.53) (-0.17) (-1.30) (-1.29) (-1.63)* 
Disteq -0.003 -0.015 -0.21 0.052 -0.534 -0.208 -0.002 -0.0007 
 (-1.26) (-0.14) (-1.60) (0.26) (-0.99) (-3.8)*** (-2.1)** (-3.8)*** 
         
N 122 82 84 85 82 85 85 52 
F 39.00*** 18.54*** 15.9*** 15.56*** 7.12*** 5.47*** 5.36*** 5.09*** 
R2 0.57 0.49 0.44 0.43 0.27 0.24 0.21 0.30 
First Stage Results: Trade Policy, Courts and Government 
  
Weighted average 
of total import 
charges  1985 
(Totimpov85) 
 
Non trade 
barriers 
(Owqi) 
 
Non tariff 
barriers 1987 
(Ntarov87) 
 
Sachs and 
Warner 
openness 1980 
(Open80s) 
 
Government 
Effectiveness 
(Ge) 
 
Regulatory 
Quality (Rq) 
 
 
Rule of law 
(Rl) 
 
Control for 
Corruption 
(Ctc) 
         
Lfrkrom 0.3739 -0.036 -18.08 0.195 0.229 0.081 0.238 0.254 
 (3.0)*** (-0.9) (-3.0)*** (2.9)*** (2.9)*** (1.31) (3.8)*** (3.3)*** 
Engfrac -0.113 -0.105 4.254 -0.018 0.573 0.324 0.586 0.832 
 (-0.23) (-0.77) (0.17) (-0.08) (1.90)* (1.32) (1.9)* (2.7)*** 
Eurfrac 0.164 -0.006 -28.107 0.208 0.457 0.572 0.302 0.0326 
 (0.67) (-0.07) (-2.3)*** (1.43) (2.5)** (3.8)*** (1.6)* (1.8)* 
 0.022 -0.001 -0.238 0.010 0.027 0.014 0.031 0.030 
Disteq (2.9)*** (-0.84) (-0.65) (3.6)*** (7.3)*** (4.8)*** (8.3)*** (8.3)*** 
         
         
N 66 83 83 54 117 122 122 118 
F 4.57*** 0.73 7.21*** 7.44*** 22.2*** 14.4*** 24.9*** 26.6*** 
R2 0.23 0.03 0.03 0.38 0.44 0.31 0.46 0.49 
- t- Values in the parenthesis. ***, **, * denotes significance at 1%, 5 % and 10% levels respectively 
Table 3.  Multiple Tests for the Relevance and Quality of Instruments for Gini Index 
  Relevance Exogeneity 
  
 
 
Endogenous Dependent Variable: 
 GINI Coefficients in Percentage Points as 
calculated from consumption expenditure by WIDER 
(Gini) 
 
 
 
 
N 
 
1st Stage 
heteroske
dasticity-
robust 
 
 
Maxima
l 2SLS 
Bias (b) 
 
Cragg-
Donald 
N*minEval 
stat. 
Chi-sq(3) 
Anderson-
Rubin test 
of joint 
significance 
of 
endogenous 
regressors 
F-Statistic 
 
Sargan 
statistic 
(overidentifica
tiontest of all 
instruments) 
Chi-Sq(2) 
Endogenous Independent Variables : Openness, Courts and Government 
(Instruments= Disteq, Lfrkrom, Engfrac, Eurfrac) 
       (0.918) 
1 Nominal Trade Shares, Government 
Effectiveness (Lcopen, Ge) 
90 Robust 0.00 73.53** 5.03*** 0.146 
       (0.929) 
2 Nominal Trade Shares, Regulatory Quality 
(Lcopen, Rq) 
96 Robust 0.00 68.52** 4.97*** 0.019 
       (0.988) 
3 Nominal Trade Shares, Rule of Law (Lcopen, Rl) 96 Robust 0.00 92.08** 4.79*** 0.116 
       (0.943) 
4 Nominal Trade Shares, Control for Corruption 
(Lcpopen, Ctc) 
92 Robust 0.00 69.77** 4.60*** 0.102 
       (0.585) 
5 Import Penetration, 1985, Rule of Law 
(Impnov85, Rl) 
69 Robust 0.00 62.63** 2.49* 0.268 
       (0.874) 
6 Import Penetration, 1982, Rule of Law 
(Impnov82, Rl) 
69 Robust 0.00 95.07** 17.74*** 11.532 
       (0.0031)*** 
7 TARS trade Penetration, 1985, Rule of Law 
(Tarshov85, Rl) 
69 Robust 0.00 52.35** 2.49* 0.162 
       (0.922) 
8 TARS Trade Penetration, 1982, Rule of Law 
(Tarshov82, Rl) 
68 Robust 0.00 73.80** 16.61*** 10.942 
       (0.004)*** 
Endogenous Independent Variables: Trade Policy and Courts 
(Instruments= Disteq, Lfrkrom, Engfrac, Eurfrac) 
        
9 Import duties, Rule of Law (Tariff, Rl) 71 Robust 0.37 3.14** 19.52*** 0.778 
       (0.677) 
10 Tariffs on International Inputs and Capital 
Goods, Rule of Law 
71 Robust 0.078 6.79** 2.62** 2.28 
 (Owti, Rl)      (0.319) 
11 Trade Taxes, Rule of Law (Txtrdg,Rl) 46 Robust 0.072 6.99** 18.20*** 0.943 
       (0.624) 
12 Weighted Average of Total import Charges, 
1985, Rule of Law 
52 Robust 0.019 9.91** 0.92 0.06 
 (Totimpov85, Rl)      (0.970) 
13 Non Trade Barriers,  Rule of Law (Owqi,Rl) 70 Robust 0.846 0.81 3.30*** 0.928 
       (0.628) 
14 Non Tariff Coverage, 1987, Rule of Law 
(Ntarfov87, Rl) 
52 Robust 0.042 8.27** 0.92 1.762 
       (0.414) 
15 Sachs and Warner Openness, 1980, Rule of 
Law, (Open80s, Rl) 
48 Robust 0.00 7.97** 1.92* 3.45 
       (0.178) 
t- Values in the parenthesis. ***, **, * denotes significance at 1%, 5 % and 10% levels respectively 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Multiple Tests for the Relevance and Quality of Instruments for Theil99 
  Relevance Exogeneity 
  
 
 
 
Endogenous Dependent Variable: 
UTIP – UNIDO Wage Inequality THEIL Measure, 1999 
(Theil99) 
 
N 
 
1st 
Stage 
heteros
kedasti
city-
robust 
 
 
Maxima
l 2SLS 
Bias (b) 
 
Cragg-
Donald 
N*minEval 
stat. 
Chi-
sq(3) 
Anderson-
Rubin test 
of joint 
significance 
of 
endoge
nous 
regressors 
F-
Statistic 
 
Sargan 
statistic 
(overidentifica
tion test of all 
instruments) 
Chi-Sq(2) 
Endogenous Independent Variables : Openness, Courts and Government  
(Instruments= Disteq, Lfrkrom, Engfrac, Eurfrac) 
       (0.589) 
16 Nominal Trade Shares, Government Effectiveness (Lcopen, 
Ge) 
117 Robust 0.00 91.62 3.38** 1.46 
       (0.48) 
17 Nominal Trade Shares, Regulatory Quality (Lcopen, Rq) 122 Robust 0.00 58.87 3.54*** 1.69 
       (0.42) 
18 Nominal Trade Shares, Rule of Law (Lcopen, Rl) 122 Robust 0.00 101.83 3.54*** 1.72 
       (0.42) 
19 Nominal Trade Shares, Control for Corruption (Lcpopen, 
Ctc) 
118 Robust 0.00 107.42 3.30** 1.76 
        
20 Import Penetration, 1985, Rule of Law (Impnov85, Rl) 85 Robust 0.00 75.48 5.28*** 1.094 
       (0.578) 
21 Import Penetration, 1982, Rule of Law (Impnov82, Rl) 84 Robust 0.00 60.64 4.87*** 0.981 
       (0.612) 
22 TARS trade Penetration, 1985, Rule of Law (Tarshov85, Rl) 85 Robust 0.00 66.09 5.28*** 1.339 
       (0.511) 
23 TARS Trade Penetration, 1982, Rule of Law (Tarshov82, Rl) 82 Robust 0.00 28.20 5.08*** 0.329 
       (0.266) 
Endogenous Independent Variables: Trade Policy and Courts 
(Instruments= Disteq, Lfrkrom, Engfrac, Eurfrac) 
        
24 Import duties, Rule of Law (Tariff, Rl) 85 Robust 0.71 1.37 6.46*** 6.289 
       (0.04)** 
25 Tariffs on International Inputs and Capital Goods, Rule of 
Law 
85 Robust 0.06 7.41 4.86*** 5.596 
 (Owti, Rl)      (0.06)* 
26 Trade Taxes, Rule of Law (Txtrdg,Rl) 52 Robust 0.08 6.74 3.47*** 4.23 
       (0.12) 
27 Weighted Average of Total import Charges, 1985, Rule of 
Law 
66 Robust 0.02 9.52 3.12*** 3.97 
 (Totimpov85, Rl)      (0.13) 
28 Non Trade Barriers,  Rule of Law (Owqi,Rl) 83 Robust 0.83 0.86 4.71*** 0.074 
       (0.96) 
29 Non Tariff Coverage, 1987, Rule of Law (Ntarfov87, Rl) 66 Robust 0.08 6.73 3.12*** 6.69 
       (0.03)** 
30 Sachs and Warner Openness, 1980, Rule of Law, (Open80s, 
Rl) 
54 Robust 0.11 5.93 4.86*** 6.769 
       (0.033)** 
t- Values in the parenthesis. ***, **, * denotes significance at 1%, 5 % and 10% levels respectively 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.  Multiple Tests for the Relevance and Quality of Instruments for High20/Low20 
  Relevance Exogeneity 
  
 
 
 
Endogenous Dependent Variable:  
Fifth Income Percentile/ First Income Percentile 
(High20/Low20) 
 
 
 
 
N 
 
1st 
Stage 
heteros
kedasti
city-
robust 
 
 
Maxima
l 2SLS 
Bias (b) 
 
Cragg-
Donald 
N*minEval 
stat. 
Chi-sq(3) 
Anderson-
Rubin test 
of joint 
significance 
of 
endogenous 
regressors 
F-
Statistic 
 
Sargan 
statistic 
(overidentifica
tion test of all 
instruments) 
Chi-Sq(2) 
Endogenous Independent Variables : Openness, Courts and Government 
(Instruments= Disteq, Lfrkrom, Engfrac, Eurfrac) 
        
31 Nominal Trade Shares, Government Effectiveness (Lcopen, 
Ge) 
90 Robust 0.00 73.53** 8.41*** 5.85 
       (0.054)* 
32 Nominal Trade Shares, Regulatory Quality (Lcopen, Rq) 96 Robust 0.00 68.52** 8.33*** 12.546 
       (0.002)*** 
33 Nominal Trade Shares, Rule of Law (Lcopen, Rl) 96 Robust 0.00 92.08** 8.33*** 5.237 
       (0.072)* 
34 Nominal Trade Shares, Control for Corruption (Lcpopen, Ctc) 92 Robust 0.00 69.77** 8.10*** 10.155 
       (0.269) 
35 Import Penetration, 1985, Rule of Law (Impnov85, Rl) 69 Robust 0.00 62.63** 7.25*** 2.463 
       (0.292) 
36 Import Penetration, 1982, Rule of Law (Impnov82, Rl) 69 Robust 0.00 95.07** 2.93** 2.415 
       (0.298) 
37 TARS trade Penetration, 1985, Rule of Law (Tarshov85, Rl) 69 Robust 0.00 52.35** 2.95** 2.378 
       (0.304) 
38 TARS Trade Penetration, 1982, Rule of Law (Tarshov82, Rl) 68 Robust 0.00 73.80** 2.78** 2.242 
       (0.326) 
Endogenous Independent Variables: Trade Policy and Courts 
(Instruments= Disteq, Lfrkrom, Engfrac, Eurfrac) 
        
39 Import duties, Rule of Law (Tariff, Rl) 71 Robust 0.37 3.14** 5.92*** 1.563 
       (0.457) 
40 Tariffs on International Inputs and Capital Goods, Rule of Law 71 Robust 0.078 6.79** 9.75*** 3.829 
 (Owti, Rl)      (0.146) 
41 Trade Taxes, Rule of Law (Txtrdg,Rl) 46 Robust 0.072 6.99** 8.16*** 1.956 
       (0.376) 
42 Weighted Average of Total import Charges, 1985, Rule of Law 52 Robust 0.019 9.91** 5.55*** 4.602 
 (Totimpov85, Rl)      (0.101) 
43 Non Trade Barriers,  Rule of Law (Owqi,Rl) 70 Robust 0.846 0.81 9.02*** 1.497 
       (0.368) 
44 Non Tariff Coverage, 1987, Rule of Law (Ntarfov87, Rl) 52 Robust 0.040 8.27** 5.55*** 0.264 
       (0.876) 
45 Sachs and Warner Openness, 1980, Rule of Law, (Open80s, Rl) 48 Robust 0.046 7.97** 7.37*** 1.791 
       (0.408) 
t- Values in the parenthesis. ***, **, * denotes significance at 1%, 5 % and 10% levels respectively 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Multiple Tests for the Relevance and Quality of Instruments for Mid20 
  Relevance Exogeneity 
  
 
 
 
Endogenous Dependent Variable:  
Third Income Percentile (Mid20) 
 
 
 
 
N 
 
1st 
Stage 
heteros
kedasti
city-
robust 
 
 
Maxima
l 2SLS 
Bias (b) 
 
Cragg-
Donald 
N*minEval 
stat. 
Chi-
sq(3) 
Anderson-
Rubin test 
of joint 
significance 
of 
endoge
nous 
regressors 
F-
Statistic 
 
Sargan statistic 
(overidentification 
test of all 
instruments) Chi-
Sq(2) 
Endogenous Independent Variables : Openness, Courts and Government  
(Instruments= Disteq, Lfrkrom, Engfrac, Eurfrac) 
 
46 
 
Nominal Trade Shares, Government Effectiveness (Lcopen, 
Ge) 
 
90 
 
Robust 
 
0.00 
 
73.53** 
 
19.49*** 
 
14.334 
       (0.0008)*** 
47 Nominal Trade Shares, Regulatory Quality (Lcopen, Rq) 96 Robust 0.00 68.52** 18.78*** 22.543 
       (0.000)*** 
48 Nominal Trade Shares, Rule of Law (Lcopen, Rl) 96 Robust 0.00 92.08** 18.78*** 11.946 
       (0.0025)*** 
49 Nominal Trade Shares, Control for Corruption (Lcpopen, Ctc) 92 Robust 0.00 69.77** 18.41*** 13.925 
       (0.001)*** 
50 Import Penetration, 1985, Rule of Law (Impnov85, Rl) 69 Robust 0.00 62.63** 16.67*** 7.951 
       (0.018)** 
51 Import Penetration, 1982, Rule of Law (Impnov82, Rl) 69 Robust 0.00 95.07** 17.02*** 8.349 
       (0.015)** 
52 TARS trade Penetration, 1985, Rule of Law (Tarshov85, Rl) 69 Robust 0.00 52.35** 16.67*** 7.114 
       (0.028)** 
53 TARS Trade Penetration, 1982, Rule of Law (Tarshov82, Rl) 68 Robust 0.00 73.80** 16.96*** 7.855 
       (0.019)** 
Endogenous Independent Variables: Trade Policy and Courts 
(Instruments= Disteq, Lfrkrom, Engfrac, Eurfrac) 
 
        
54 Import duties, Rule of Law (Tariff, Rl) 71 Robust 0.37 3.14** 19.37*** 0.997 
       (0.607) 
55 Tariffs on International Inputs and Capital Goods, Rule of Law 71 Robust 0.078 6.79** 22.43*** 3.910 
 (Owti, Rl)      (0.142) 
56 Trade Taxes, Rule of Law (Txtrdg,Rl) 46 Robust 0.072 6.99** 16.92*** 0.297 
       (0.862) 
57 Weighted Average of Total import Charges, 1985, Rule of Law 52 Robust 0.019 9.91** 6.77*** 8.673 
 (Totimpov85, Rl)      (0.013)** 
58 Non Trade Barriers,  Rule of Law (Owqi,Rl) 70 Robust 0.846 0.81 20.23*** 2.144 
       (0.342) 
59 Non Tariff Coverage, 1987, Rule of Law (Ntarfov87, Rl) 52 Robust 0.040 8.27** 6.77*** 1.037 
       (0.597) 
60 Sachs and Warner Openness, 1980, Rule of Law, (Open80s, Rl) 48 Robust 0.046 7.97** 21.25*** 3.783 
t- Values in the parenthesis. ***, **, * denotes significance at 1%, 5 % and 10% levels respectively 
 
  
 3.2. Relevance and Exogeniety of Instruments 
This section undertakes relevance and exogeniety tests under higher order asymptotic 
framework for the institutional and integration regressors for GINI, Theil, High20/Low20 and 
Mid20 for some selected number of combinations of these regressors. Relevance and 
exogeniety tests are also carried out for Low10 and High10, but they are not presented here as 
the results obtained by former tests would already provide enough information to conclude 
whether instruments have worked well.  
 
Table 3 provides results for Gini. Instruments pass the relevance test for any of the 
combinations of institutions and integration except for Owqi. Owqi fails relevance test for not 
only Gini, but also for Theil in table 4, High20/Low20 in table 5 and Mid20 in table 6. This is 
expected as we already know from 1st stage results that all instruments have been insignificant 
in case of Owqi, while the F-statistic was approximating to 0. Instruments have been found to 
be weakly related with Taiffs for Theil99. For other dependent variables also like Gini, 
High20/Low20 and Mid20, the 2SLS bias in case of Tariffs is large. This is also in line with 1st 
stage results, where most instruments fail to significantly explain Tariffs with the only exception 
of Disteq.  
 
 The 2nd stage regressions have suffered more from the problem of endogeniety, especially 
in case of High20/Low20 and Mid 20 whenever, Legal, and Economic institutions enter with 
outcome based (openness) measures of trade barriers. This brings us back to the analysis by 
Rodrik et al (2004), which was run on per capita income differences and problem of 
endogeniety was present in all regressions. High20/Low20 and Mid20 are also estimates of 
incomes but based on percentiles. The persistent of the presence of endogeniety in 
specifications where nominal trade shares enter as a regressor to reconfirm that such 
specifications may suffer from omitted variable bias.  
 
Nevertheless, no presence of 2SLS bias which is seen to approximate to 0 in all cases where 
openness is the regressor show that IV analysis is superior to simple OLS in present 
specifications. In case of trade policy, over-identification tests are generally passed for all those 
trade policy proxies that have passed the Cragg-Donald maximal 2SLS bias test of relevance. 
Only in case of Theil99 few trade policy proxies such as Owti, Ntarfov and Open80s in addition 
to Owqi fail over-identification tests.  Tables 3, 4, 5 and 6 also  show that for all combinations of 
regressors and for all dependent variables heterskedasticity robust estimates are utilized. 
 
3.3. IV Results on Institutions 
Due to the sheer number of specifications for which the regressions are carried out for six 
different dependent variables, it is not possible to present results for both institutions and 
integration together in single table. Thus, in order to cover all specifications, we discuss only 
results for institutions.  
 
 
 3.3.1. Courts 
 
As explained above, control for corruption and rule of law are considered as legal institutions 
representing courts. Rule of law broadly defines it self as measures to enforce public and 
private contracts for protection of public and private property through implementation of 
property rights and provisions for dispute settlement through an efficient judicial system. 
Control for corruption measures nepotism, rent seeking behavior, state capture of private 
resources or dishonest courts. Both definitions of legal institutions are quite endogenous to 
each other.  
 
Barreto (1996) finds that corruption correlates positively and significantly with inequality, 
implying that increased income inequality is associated with greater corruption. Tanzi (1995) 
argues that the benefits from corruption are likely to accrue to the better-connected individuals 
in society, who mostly belong to high-income groups. It has been further contended that 
corruption creates incentives for higher investment in capital-intensive projects and lower 
investment in labor intensive projects (UNDP 1997), thus increasing wage inequality. Gupta et 
al. (1998) show that a worsening of the corruption index of a country by one standard deviation 
(2.52 points on a scale of 0 to 10) is associated with an increase in the GINI coefficient of about 
4.4 points.  
Table 7 Rule of Law 
 Dependent Variables 
Independent Variabl es Wage 
Inequality 
(Theil) 
Income 
Inequality 
(Gini) 
High20/L
ow20 
Middle20 Low10 High10 
       
Rule of Law (Lcopen) -0.02 -7.30 -5.08 1.82 0.48 -5.75 
 (-1.48) (-5.01)*** (-3.44)*** (5.59)*** (3.03)*** (-5.14)*** 
Rule of Law (Impnov85) -0.04 -7.35 -5.49 1.81 0.48 -5.61 
 (2.30)** (-4.17)*** (-2.76)*** (4.48)*** (2.50)** (-4.04)*** 
Rule of Law (Impnov82) -0.03 -7.23 -5.23 1.77 0.49 -5.55 
 (-1.80)* (-4.48)*** (-2.91)*** (4.81)*** (2.79)*** (-4.39)*** 
Rule of Law (Tarshov85) -0.04 -7.62 -5.66 1.86 0.52 -5.79 
 (-2.49)** (-4.18)*** (-2.77)*** (4.46)*** (2.63)*** (-4.05)*** 
Rule of Law (Tarshov82) -0.04 -7.32 -5.31 1.79 0.50 -5.61 
 (-2.43)** (-4.37)*** (-2.82)*** (4.69)*** (2.75)*** (-4.26)*** 
Rule of Law (Open80s) -0.02 -11.58 -9.05 2.43 1.09 -8.32 
 (-0.70) (-3.42)*** (-2.15)** (3.76)*** (2.68)*** (-3.60)*** 
Rule of Law (Tariffs) 0.02 -18.23 -10.64 3.44 2.24 -12.07 
 (0.33) (-2.38)*** (-1.85)* (2.51)*** (2.00)** (-2.41)** 
Rule of Law (Owti) -0.05 -10.45 -6.22 2.31 0.97 -7.69 
 (-2.22)** (-3.57)*** (-2.51)** (3.69)*** (2.78)*** (-3.44)*** 
Rule of Law (Txtrdg) 0.02 -15.05 -9.16 3.37 1.31 -11.24 
 (0.74) (-2.17)** (-2.17)** (2.95)*** (2.26)** (-2.85)*** 
Rule of Law (Totimpov85) 0.007 -6.84 -8.57 1.59 0.61 -5.06 
 (0.18) (-1.37) (-1.30) (1.42) (1.14) (-1.30) 
Rule of Law (Owqi) -0.09 -3.25 -1.09 1.13 0.17 -3.05 
 (-1.04) (-0.53) (-0.24) (1.06) (0.33) (-0.76) 
Rule of Law (Ntarfov87) 0.02 -16.03 -12.71 2.82 1.38 -9.71 
 (0.48) (-1.72)* (-1.60) (1.80)* (1.58) (-1.72)* 
                                    -***, **, * corresponds to 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. 
                                     - Control variables are in parentheses in the first column 
 Less corruption can only be practiced through an effective system of property rights and the 
rule of law. Rule of law provides protection and safety to people and their businesses. The 
society is respectful to law only when they see that the justice system is fair which treats 
people equally. A corrupt justice system may shield dishonest elites from re-distribution. 
Fairness of legal system is more important than fair political process where democracy is about 
equal access and power for all who have voted. Elections show participation of interest groups 
that mobilize masses to their own interest and thus the outcome may still depict the hold of 
power of the few upon the interest of many. In contrast only fair judicial system can ensure 
effective accountability. In some cases democratic politics has actually played a role in 
undermining rule of law by disfavoring underprivileged groups (Ahnen, 2007).  
 
Rule of law ensures transparency of the political process: ‘an effective democratic legal order 
provides the necessary underpinnings for elections to be truly free and fair, and thus for 
democracy to exist at all’ (O’ Donnell 2001; 71). Re-distribution is ensured when political power 
is equally distributed (populist democracy) against oligharic society where political power 
remains with the few ruling elites. However the causality from democracy to redistribution runs 
through enforcement of property rights (Acemoglu, 2003).  
 
The relationship between good legal institutions and other institutions in redistribution is 
highly correlated. Thus, it remains important to disentangle the effects to determine relative 
relevance of different areas of governance in inequality mitigation. Democratic political 
institutions may also be relevant, and no less than rule of law, to capture redistribution among 
different income groups while social institutions play a key role to ensure that equality prevails 
in a society, especially when countries open up to increased international trade. Glaser (2004) 
and Williamson (1999) argue that causality goes from social institutions to legal institutions 
because only well developed (educated) societies can enable the courts to function effectively 
and more people would respect rule of law. Nevertheless, legal institutions, in comparison to 
political or social institutions and in context of their strong correlation with each other, cannot 
be considered less important, if not more important. Brinks (2008) quite nicely summarize the 
problem as he tries to disentangle effects of different institutions on inequality: 
Does it mean institutional differences ultimately do not matter and all the focus on judicial and 
legal reform is misguided? Clearly not. The inquisitorial nature of Uruguay’s system makes 
judges more prosectorial, giving victims a stronger, less impartial ally) if simultaneously raising 
due process concerns). Institutional change can be effective precisely when it builds lateral 
support for the claims and the claimants at issue, taking into consideration the respondent’s 
capacity for and modes of resistance. In the context of criminal prosecutions for rights 
violations, states could create more effective internal controls within the police and more 
protections for whistle blowers. Special-purpose prosecutorial agencies with independent 
investigative resources would be dramatic improvement. In short, one can imagine a series of 
improvements to state apparatus that could help; this is, essentially, the process of developing 
lateral support for the substantive right in question. The precise nature of the lateral support 
required, however, will vary with nature of the right conferred and with the situation of the 
claimant-respondant dyad’ (p.22)  
Table 8 Control for Corruption 
 Dependent Variables 
Independent Variables Wage 
Inequalit
y (Theil) 
Income 
Inequalit
y (Gini) 
High20/L
ow20 
Middle20 Low10 High10 
       
Control for Corruption (Lcopen) -0.02 -3.390 -5.39 1.87 0.46 -5.88 
 (-1.44) (-4.84)*** (-3.31)*** (5.47)*** (2.76)*** (-5.03)*** 
Control for Corruption (Impnov85) -0.03 -6.481 -5.01 1.64 0.37 -5.01 
 (-2.21)** (-3.95)*** (-2.52)*** (4.32)*** (2.05)** (-3.88)*** 
Control for Corruption (Impnov82) -0.02 -6.458 -4.81 1.62 0.41 05.02 
 (-1.71)* (-4.32)*** (-2.69)*** (4.72)*** (2.42)** (-4.29)*** 
Control for Corruption (Tarshov85) -0.03 -6.72 -5.20 1.69 0.41 -5.19 
 (-2.41)** (-3.93)*** (-2.52)*** (4.29)*** (2.15)** (-3.87)*** 
Control for Corruption (Tarshov82) -0.04 -6.51 -4.88 1.64 0.41 -5.04 
 (-2.41)** (-4.16)*** (-2.60)*** (4.55)*** (2.35)** (-4.12)*** 
Control for Corruption (Open80s) -0.02 -11.32 -9.33 2.47 1.03 -8.38 
 (-0.70) (-3.07)*** (-1.89)* (3.32)*** (2.34)** (-3.25)*** 
Control for Corruption (Tariffs) 0.05 -22.77 -13.10 4.32 2.77 -15.19 
 (0.57) (-1.78)* (-1.45) (1.87)* (1.54) (-1.81)* 
Control for Corruption (Owti) -0.05 -10.22 -6.29 2.35 0.91 -7.74 
 (-2.19)** (-3.26)*** (-2.19)** (3.31)*** (2.44)** (-3.11)*** 
Control for Corruption (Txtrdg) 0.02 -12.50 -7.56 2.84 1.04 -9.89 
 (0.94) (-3.09)*** (-2.12)** (3.20)*** (2.30)** (-3.09)*** 
Control for Corruption 
(Totimpov85) 
0.02 -0.13 -5.13 0.33 -0.32 -0.27 
(0.34) (-0.03) (-0.73) (0.30) (-0.59) (-0.07) 
Control for Corruption (Owqi) -0.10 -1.26 0.12 0.79 -0.10 -1.78 
 (-0.94) (-0.17) (0.02) (0.63) (-0.14) (-0.36) 
Control for Corruption (Ntarfov87) 0.04 -16.14 -15.14 2.82 1.06 -9.29 
 (0.34) (-1.30) (-1.33) (1.37) (1.02) (-1.29) 
 
                                  -***, **, * corresponds to 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. Control variables are in parentheses in the first column 
 
Tables 7 and 8 show the results for legal institutions. The results suggest that legal 
institutions significantly affect income inequalities for both developing and developed countries 
and the relationship is negative. High coefficients of Gini and incidence of significance at 1% 
level in 9 out of 12 instances when rule of law and control for corruption has been found to be 
significantly related with Gini, suggest that good legal institutions play a vital role in decreasing 
within country income inequalities. Legal institutions are also negatively and significantly 
related with wage inequality, however low coefficients indicate limited role played by legal 
institutions in effecting the skill premia in favor of unskilled. Results based on the ratio of 
income percentiles (High20/Low20), show that rule of law and control for corruption have 
strong redistributive power. The relationship between legal institutions and income of the 
middle-income groups (Middle20) as well as low-income groups for Rl and Ctc is positive and 
significant. This means that good quality legal institutions do not only reach out to the middle 
income groups but they are also altruistic to the poorest of the poor. The evidence quite 
robustly suggests that redistribution of income takes place from the richest to the middle-class 
or lower middle-class as both proxies of the legal institutions are negatively related with High10 
and High20 in 9 out of 12 cases and the relationship is mostly significant at 1 %. The high 
coefficients for High10 and low coefficients of low10 may confer that more effective 
redistribution takes place from the richest to the middle income or lower middle income group, 
whereas lowest income group is relatively less sensitive to this redistribution process. It may 
not be sound legal institutions that can really lift the poor from the bottom of the pyramid but 
it is good economic policies which can ensure higher GDP growth, which may more effectively 
trickle down to improve the incomes of the poorest of the poor through targeted development 
strategies e.g. micro finance.  
3.3.2. The Government  
 
Government effectiveness (Ge) measures outcomes like bureaucratic delays, states ability to 
formulate and implement national policy initiatives, effectiveness in collecting taxes other other 
government revenue, maintenance of government infrastructure, responsiveness to economic 
problems, decentralisation, and independence from pressure from interest groups, sound social 
development policies and pro-business orientation. Regulatory quality (Rq) captures outcomes 
like price liberalization, trade and foreign exchange system, competition policy, commercial law 
effectiveness, privatization, financial regulations and banking reforms, interest rate 
liberalization, and promotion of market friendly regulatory framework.  
Table 9 
Government Effectiveness 
 Dependent Variables 
Independent Variables Wage 
Inequalit
y (Theil) 
Income 
Inequalit
y (Gini) 
High20/L
ow20 
Middle20 Low10 High10 
       
Government Effectiveness  
(Lcopen) 
-0.025 -8.60 -6.56 2.19 0.552 -6.817 
(-1.54) (-5.00)*** (-3.61)*** (5.63)*** (2.97)*** (-5.17)*** 
Government Effectiveness  
(Impnov85) 
-0.039 -8.03 -6.47 2.02 0.49 -6.17 
(-2.34)** (-4.19)*** (2.87)*** (4.56)*** (2.40)** (-4.13)*** 
Government Effectiveness  
(Impnov82) 
-0.028 -7.86 -6.13 1.97 0.51 -6.08 
(-1.86)* (-4.47)*** (-2.99)*** (4.84)*** (2.67)*** (-4.43)*** 
Government Effectiveness  
(Tarshov85) 
-0.04 -8.31 -6.67 2.08 0.53 -6.37 
(2.55)** (-4.17)*** (-2.89)*** (4.53)*** (2.49)** (-4.12)*** 
Government Effectiveness 
 (Tarshov82) 
-0.04 -7.87 -6.21 1.98 0.51 -6.07 
(-2.53)** (-4.30)*** (-2.90)* (4.68)*** (2.57)*** (-4.25)*** 
Government Effectiveness 
(Open80s) 
-0.05 -11.85 -11.46 2.72 0.96 -8.91 
(-1.30) (-2.69)*** (-1.89)* (3.02)*** (2.00)** (-2.92)*** 
Government Effectiveness (Tariffs) 0.07 -25.83 -15.53 4.99 3.11 -17.08 
 (0.39) (-1.59) (-1.36) (1.69)* (1.38) (-1.63) 
Government Effectiveness (Owti) -0.07 -13.23 -8.17 3.02 1.12 -9.79 
 (-2.40)** (-3.11)*** (-2.29)** (3.25)*** (2.44)** (-3.04)*** 
Government Effectiveness (Txtrdg) 0.04 -14.73 -8.72 3.40 1.18 -11.76 
 (0.94) (-2.74)*** (-1.93)* (2.80)*** (2.09)** (-2.71)*** 
Government Effectiveness  
(Totimpov85) 
-0.01 1.62 -4.59 0.18 -0.48 0.75 
(-0.13) (0.31) (-0.63) (0.16) (-0.84) (0.19) 
Government Effectiveness (Owqi) -0.09 -3.11 -1.47 1.26 0.04 -3.28 
 (-1.08) (-0.48) (-0.33) (1.16) (0.07) (-0.80) 
Government Effectiveness  
(Ntarfov87) 
-0.05 -21,39 -17.76 3.42 1.19 -10.64 
(-0.47) (-1.11) (-1.27) (1.30) (0.98) (-1.21) 
 
                                     -***, **, * corresponds to 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. 
                                     - Control variables are in parentheses in the first column 
 
 
Every effective government must maintain a sustainable fiscal policy, which includes a deficit 
that is manageable in the short-term, and the associated public debt it creates being 
serviceable. More concentration of resources on social sector is always pro-poor. Capital 
market liberalization and broader financial sector reforms are necessary to integrate with 
global markets. Decentralization is important for effective implementation of government 
policies at grass roots level which can promote redistribution through effective social 
development. Incorporation of effective tax structure where value added tax gives way to a 
more pro-poor tax system is at the heart of good fiscal policy. (Roy and Weeks 2003) Inflation in 
many developing countries is an outcome of political decisions when government has a lax 
monetary policy and is unable or unwilling to increase taxes. High inflation has a negative 
distribution effect. In developed countries sometimes, monetary policy outcomes relate to 
increased inequalities. Khalifa (2005) shows that a positive shock to Federal Reserve fund rates 
in the US induced a larger and more persistent increase in the unemployment ratio of the low 
skilled relative to that of high skilled, indicating that low skilled bear the brunt of the increase in 
unemployment after a contractionary policy. The results in table 9 show that government 
effectiveness is significantly and negatively related with High10, Gini and Theil99. The 
coefficients for Gini and High10 are large while significant is mostly achieved at 1% level for Gini 
and High10. This indicates that government policies like decentralization, effective tax structure 
and implementation of social development policies significantly decrease income inequality and 
also redistribute income from the elite to lower segments of the society. Effective governments 
are more democratic in nature as well: ‘ Decentralization can be defined as meaningful 
authority devolved to local unites of governance that are accessible and accountable to the 
local citizenry, who enjoy full political rights and liberty.’ (Blair, 2000; 21) While the 
democratization and empowerment of administrative bodies can enhance participation of such 
groups that have been marginalized before thus bringing more potential for social development 
and improvement of livelihood opportunities for these marginalized. Table 9, shows that 
effective governments are positively and significantly related with the incomes of the bottom 
deciles and medium percentile establishing its strong redistributive power.  
 
In contrast to government effectiveness, the results on regulatory quality in inequality 
mitigation and redistribution of wealth are not that encouraging. (See table 10) Rq mostly 
remains non responsive to Gini and Theil99. There is even an instance when Rq enters into the 
Gini equation with the wrong sign while it is significant at 5 % - highest level achieved in any of 
the cases for Gini.  
 
Though, some signs of redistribution are present from richest to middle class, but for 
incomes of the poorest, Rq is mostly insignificant. However, the wrong signs of the coefficients 
of Rq, which are highlighted in grey, suggests that regulatory quality actually disfavor the poor. 
On the hindsight this may be an expected result. Regulatory quality captures outcomes like 
trade and financial (capital market) liberalization which has been increasingly related with crises 
and growth failures recently. This extract which is taken from the Nobel Prize lecture of Joseph 
Stiglitz tells about a thin line that exists between a good economic policy and the bad ones. 
 
‘They (IMF) actually promoted contractionary fiscal policies for countries facing an economic 
downturn - and they advocated polices like capital market liberalization, for which there was 
little evidence that growth was promoted, while there was ample evidence that such policies 
generated instability.’ (Stiglitz, 2001)  
 
Most developed and developing countries have encountered exchange rate crises, capital 
market crises and financial recessions in last few decades. Thus what regulatory quality may 
also be picking up is increased risk of crises which integrated capital markets and free or 
floating exchange rate regimes put on countries. There is a strong correlation between capital 
market crisis and financial liberalization. (See Kawai and Takagi, 2008; for detailed literature 
review on risk of financial crises and capital market management) Measures to open capital 
markets put developing countries at a higher risk of financial crises.  
 
United States Sub prime mortgage crises has transformed into a global financial crises while 
factors like oil price hike and staple food inflation has added up to the welfare distorting effect 
of the crises for developing many countries who are now facing increased inflationary pressures 
which are mostly beyond the control of monetary policy. Thus regulatory quality, which has 
been very relevant to income generation, has been found to be less relevant for inequality 
mitigation.  
Table 10 Regulatory Quality 
 Dependent Variables 
Independent Variables Wage 
Inequalit
y (Theil) 
Income 
Inequalit
y (Gini) 
High20/L
ow20 
Middle20 Low10 High10 
       
Regulatory Quality (Lcopen) -0.03 -3.44 -4.48 1.72 0.10 -5.01 
 (-1.44) (-1.31) (-1.93)* (3.10)*** (0.40) (2.65)*** 
Regulatory Quality (Impnov85) -0.04 -4.69 -4.72 1.44 -0.07 -3.75 
 (-1.73)* (-1.53) (-1.48) (2.05)** (-0.23) (-1.54) 
Regulatory Quality ity (Impnov82) -0.03 -5.54 -5.30 1.71 0.05 -4.73 
 (-1.37) (-1.89)* (-1.73)* (2.52)*** (0.16) (-2.30)** 
Regulatory Quality (Tarshov85) -0.05 -4.41 -4.66 1.39 -0.09 -3.53 
 (-1.92)* (-1.40) (-1.40) (1.92)* (-0.28) (-1.41) 
Regulatory Quality (Tarshov82) -0.05 -4.86 -5.00 1.53 0.02 -4.09 
 (-2.13)** (-1.64)* (-1.60) (2.24)** (0.07) (-1.74)* 
Regulatory Quality (Open80s) -0.02 4.71 -4.44 -0.14 -1.22 2.34 
 (-0.36) (0.67) (-0.62) (-0.10) (-1.43) (0.47) 
Regulatory Quality (Tariffs) 0.04 3.53 -3.09 -4.40 -0.46 3.50 
 (0.46) (0.30) (-0.32) (-0.15) (-0.40) (0.36) 
Regulatory Quality (Owti) -0.05 0.35 0.47 0.25 -0.73 0.50 
 (-1.57) (0.06) (0.10) (0.18) (-1.01) (0.10) 
Regulatory Quality (Txtrdg) 0.15 -26.61 -16.89 6.64 1.67 -22.75 
 (1.19) (-1.74)* (-1.36) (1.82)* (1.21) (-1.77)* 
Regulatory Quality (Totimpov85) -0.005 10.33 3.60 -1.87 -1.47 7.49 
 (-0.11) (1.99)** (0.56) (-1.66) (-2.40)** (1.91)* 
Regulatory Quality (Owqi) -0.08 4.84 3.93 0.53 -0.32 2.56 
 (-1.23) (0.37) (0.45) (0.17) (-0.15) (0.27) 
Regulatory Quality (Ntarfov87) -0.13 5.85 -3.70 -1.00 -0.97 4.48 
 (-1.15) (0.68) (-0.37) (-0.58) (-1.03) (0.74) 
 
                                   -***, **, * corresponds to 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. 
                                   - Control variables are in parentheses in the first column 
4. Conclusions: 
 
 Courts that ensure rule of law and take action against corruption also guarantee that raise in 
per capita income also favor the lower income groups. That is true for both developed and 
developing countries. Effective monetary and fiscal policy that can check inflationary trends and 
practice positive real interest rates would eventually benefit the poor. However regulation is 
found to be generally insensitive towards economic welfare. This may be because governments 
generally regulate institutions to the benefit of market forces. Though, this does not necessarily 
mean that regulation policies create inequalities as we find in our analysis that fails to establish 
any significant relationship of regulatory quality with various measures of inequality used in the 
paper.  
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